Th e paper proposes the model of discursive mind and describes the cognitive architecture of the dialogically structured mind. Th e model draws on Hermans' (1999) theory of the dialogical self (DS) and Wertsch's (1991) vision of mind as a "tool kit" with socio-cultural instruments, and also on the socio-cognitive approach to personality in experimental psychology. An I-position is understood here as an active totality of experience, shaped in a particular social context and represented in a separate representation module. Th ere are many modules in the mind because in the course of socialization, the individual comes across many diff erent social contexts. Th e described model and its preliminary empirical verifi cation not only gives support to the DS theory, but can also be a leverage of its contribution to general theories of mind stemming from other theoretical traditions. . We describe theories that served as a basis for the model, taken from both the social cognitive approach to personality and discursive and dialogical concepts.
Referring to the classical diff erentiation described by James, it can be stated that contemporary theories of self show the multiplicity of its object-oriented aspect, but are scarcely interested in the multiplicity of the subject-oriented aspect of self. Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) -with the help of the computer metaphor -gave modern meaning to James' diff erentiation as a distinction between data (declarations) and process (procedures). Since then, the subject-oriented aspect of self can no longer be thought of as metaphysical or scientifi cally immeasurable. Indeed, in the last two decades we can observe a considerable increase of researchers' interest in the subject-oriented aspect of self, yet they do not refer to the idea of the multiplicity of the subjective self. As far as we know, no theoretical model that would thoroughly describe this idea has so far been put forward in mainstream psychology. However, it seems that the idea of the multiplicity of the subjective self could open quite novel perspectives on many psychological phenomena.
Th e discursive mind model presented in this paper was proposed by Katarzyna Stemplewska-Żakowicz (2004) . Th e reason behind the development of this model was to adapt the Dialogical Self Th eory to the requirements of experimental research. It draws on earlier concepts of the discursive mind developed by Stemplewska-Żakowicz (2001) , which have similar inspirations in the dialogical self theory, and at the same time refers to social-cognitive approaches.
Assumptions of the discursive mind model
Th e idea of the discursive organization of the cognitive system, inspired by Vygotsky's (1982) and Bakhtin's (1984) ideas and social constructionists' concepts (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) , combined with other ideas of discursive psychology, forms the foundation for the model described in this paper. According to this view, there are a number of holistic modules of representation which exist in our mind. Th ey have relative autonomy and every module is related to a specifi c social context, present in one's history of socialization. As they are formed by diff erent ways of giving meaning to personal experience, each of the modules contains specifi c cognitive-aff ective resources. Th e important parts of the social contexts in which these patt erns of naming and organizing experience are formed include relationships with signifi cant others, infl uential groups and social backgrounds (Hermans, 1999; Wertsch, 1991) .
Based on the idea outlined above, we present three key assumptions of our discursive mind model:
1. the modular character of a person's knowledge structures; 2. the social origin of a person's knowledge structures; 3. the specifi city of knowledge structures for the social context from which they stem.
Th e fi rst two of these assumptions are shared among a variety of contemporary theories; however, the third assumption, which is essential for the model presented here, has so far not been an important subject of interest in mainstream psychology.
Modularity of personal knowledge structures in modern psychological theories (assumption one)
Th e fi rst assumption -about the modular character of the cognitive system -can be found in a variety of approaches (Epstein, 1991; Fodor, 1983; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978; Greenwald, 1982; Minsky, 1985; Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) . Most generally, it can be understood as referring to the idea, widely accepted nowadays, of cognitive structures being organized as systems of schemas. It started to be recognized in theories of self when the concept of self schemas was fi rst introduced by Markus (1977) , who showed in her studies that the activation of a schema referring to a particular fi eld of knowledge makes it easier to state opinions and make decisions in this fi eld. It also helps remember information related to this fi eld of knowledge and to predict future behavior.
Jerry Fodor (1983) was the fi rst to describe the mind as a structure composed of modules. Criticizing computer metaphors of mind, according to which the whole mind is engaged in processing a particular piece of information, he (Fodor, 2000) pointed out that this kind of activity is energy-consuming and thus uneconomical and unnecessary in effi cient operations. His concept of module (Fodor, 1983) describes a structure specialized in dealing with a particular class of stimuli and thus processing a particular kind of information faster than general structures as well as engaging less cognitive resources. Fodor's concept (1983) focused on basic processes not requiring the engagement of att ention processes or working memory and mostly referring to perception (face recognition, sound to language structure transcript). Processes of this kind run automatically, preparing data which are later integrated at a higher level by non-modular central processes such as thinking. A module accepts only external stimuli of one kind and ignores other stimuli, remaining closed to their access; it works automatically, which means that once it is activated it continues to work until it has completed its task (Fodor, 1983) . Critical followers of Fodor's ideas, Cosmides and Tooby (1994) , describe modules as if they were built according to the principle of best adaptation, working fast and automatically, thus being time-effi cient and saving energy needed for making decisions, oft en operating directly and continuously from registering a stimulus to initiating behavior.
In our model we assume that the adaptive structure of the mind is composed of many specialized information processing subsystems, strictly related to and dependent on the topic of the information and operating automatically. Modules are partly closed, as defi ned by Cosmides and Tooby (1994) : Th ey remain latent and closed to information stored in a diff erent code than the one processed by the particular module, although they remain open to information encoded using the same code or a code similar to the one assigned to the module. Fodor (1983) made a distinction between vertical and horizontal mind structures, calling them longitudinal modularity and transversal modularity, respectively. Th is brings to mind a structural division of modules into upper and lower levels, with diff erent parallel modules existing at each level. Th is idea can be well clarifi ed using a similar hypothesis, though diff erent in its origins and inspirations, namely the levels of processing proposed by Anthony Greenwald (1982 Greenwald ( , 1988 . For Greenwald (1982) , the cognitive system comprises subsystems organized in consecutive levels. Th ese subsystems are information processing units that operate using diff erent processing codes and are specialized to deal uniquely with information encoded in the same code. Th ese subsystems are organized as bott om-up levels, starting with the lowest up to the highest, where conscious thinking takes place. Greenwald (1988) introduces two conditions for the subsystems to be independent, partly limiting the exchange of information between them. Th ese are diff erences in code types and limitations in a subsystem's access to knowledge stored in another subsystem. Th e main barrier in information exchange occurs between the procedural and declarative codes. Only a part of the information processed at lower levels, operating in procedural codes, temporal-sensual in character (i.e. motor), becomes recognized and translated into imaginative code, eventually becoming accessible to one's non-verbal insight. Th en, some even smaller part is further recognized and encoded in verbal code in order to become a part of the conscious declarative knowledge of the subject. Th e hypothesis of levels of processing clarifi es the processes of representing one's experience, in which pieces of experience are retained at lower levels and cannot be brought to the consciousness (in other words: represented in verbal code), but nonetheless infl uence feelings, states or behavior. Th is kind of information processing is described in literature as implicit social cognition or automatic information processing (Bargh, 1994 (Bargh, , 1999 Chen & Bargh, 1997; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Stemplewska-Żakowicz, 2004; Underwood, 1996) and can be found in many theories, e.g. subsystems of information processing or computer-based simulations of the modular structure of the mind (Nowak et al., 2000) .
Th e concept of levels of representation makes it possible to pose a question similar to Fodor's above-mentioned question addressed to classical psychology of the mind: Can representations at those levels be perceived as a complete tool, processing a whole range of information, or is it required to have specialized and independent units? Can processing be more eff ective? Th is draws our att ention to longitudinal modularity: the vertical division crossing the horizontal levels. Th ese longitudinal modules operate using separate, specifi c discursive codes we describe here together with the third assumption.
Social origin of personal knowledge structures (assumption two)
Th e second assumption is based on the proposition that information is processed by knowledge structures that stem from the social environments of a par-ticular person. Similarly to the fi rst assumption, this one is also widely described in socio-cognitive personality theories (Bandura, 1999; Pervin & John, 2001) , social cognition concepts (Forgas, 1981; Forgas & Williams, 2002; Moskowitz, 2005; Underwood, 1996) , social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and in still developing theories of shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Jost & Kruglanski, 2002) . Th e social environment means not only a source of stimuli related to a person's social activity but also a source of ways of processing and storing social information. Knowledge from cognitive and communication psychology helps describe the role of interpersonal activities in shaping the content of personal knowledge and the structures in which this knowledge is stored (Higgins, 2000) .
A fi ne example of an approach based on the assumption described here is the relational self theory put forward by Susan Andersen and Serena Chen (2002) . According to the authors, the self-structure is composed of a number of relational schemas developed in the course of long-term relations with signifi cant others (e.g. parents) whose representations are saved in the cognitive system. Each representation of a signifi cant other is linked with a particular representation of self, and these pair packages of co-linked representations create the schemas of the relational self, constantly available, diff erent in content but launched by different classes of external stimuli. Connections between knowledge about self and knowledge about others develop due to aff ective processes -they are nurtured by the long-term, emotional and motivational occupation with signifi cant others. Th e theory shows how separate units of representation develop, shaped by relations with others, and then how these schemas set directions for a person's interpretation of experience. Daniel Cervone's KAPA (Knowledge-and-Appraisal Personality Architecture) model is a similar concept, although it focuses on the meaning of interaction between a person and a situation as a foundation of the cognitive system and, at the same time, a person's inner lability. Cervone (2004) expands the vision of self as being composed of schemas by describing the rules governing the availability of knowledge structures, as posited by the social cognition approach. He sees personality as a structure of cognitive aff ective units forming regular patt erns of experience interpretation (Cervone, 2004) . Th ese units comprise knowledge -representations of diff erent elements of the world and of the person in his/her mind -and appraisal, which is a sort of dynamic network connecting the units. Relations with others are not the only source of cognitive aff ective schemas -they also draw from wider external contexts. Each piece of knowledge is att ributed to a particular situational context and aff ects the appraisal, which occurs within a person only in a context specifi c for the schema. In addition, people diff er in the way in which the network connecting the schemas and the contexts is shaped. Th e contexts can also diff er idiosyncratically -two persons bearing the belief that they are shy can have diff erent subjective perspectives on the social contexts in which such a trait as shyness is important and thus be or feel shy in diff erent situations and for diff erent reasons. Cervone's model (2004) is a challenge for the experimental method, which relies on standardized stimuli evoking reactions among participants, because the standardization of the stimuli is disabled by the model itself. In his research on people who smoke, the author came up with a method based on priming in which the priming stimuli were developed individually for each participant and, at the same time, were equivalent among all participants (Cervone et al., 2008) . A similar methodology was suggested by Cervone in regard to research on activating I-positions in the dialogical self theory2, which can be a solution bett er than trying to activate the same or similar I-positions among all the participants, assuming that they exist in the participants' repertoire .
Social cognition theories indicate that a person brings earlier att itudes to the cognition process and that these att itudes infl uence information processing in regard to the properties of this object, such as its description, classifi cation or rating its importance. Th e knowledge stored in the mind determines patt erns of interpreting signals from the environment (Forgas, 1981) by means of selective att ention, information processing limits in the mind, reduction of the amount of data processed in case of complex objects of cognition (such as humans or social situations), or other well-known cognitive eff ects -priming eff ect, primacy eff ect or framing eff ect (Moskowitz, 2005) . Currently, the idea of processes of social negotiation and sharing cognitive content, the availability of which depends on the external relational context, is widely accepted (Moskowitz, 2005) . According to social cognition theories, knowledge referring to the object of cognition is determined mostly by real features of the object and can be modifi ed only by elements that are brought into the cognition process by a particular person. Th e third assumption of the discursive mind model is contrary to this idea: not the object of cognition, but the cognitively active subject is the key factor in the whole process of cognition.
Toward the specifi city of knowledge structures for the social contextdiscursive approach concepts (assumption three)
Although overlooked or undervalued by mainstream psychology, the third assumption mentioned above is still present in the concepts of social constructivism and discursive psychology. However, as these theories -e.g. Rom Harré's theory of positioning (Harré & Gillett , 1994; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999) or the infl uential ideas of Kenneth Gergen (1991 Gergen ( , 2009 , Derek Edwards and Jonathan Pott er (1992) and Michael Billig (1996) -usually reject experimental methodology and discard traditional notions such as cognitive representation, they also do not put forward any precise model of the mind's architecture. Th us, no specifi c hypothesis that could later be verifi ed can be drawn from these theories. Th e contrast between the discursive ideas and the personality and social cognition 2 Information from face-to-face conversation.
theories mentioned above can be perceived as another exemplifi cation of the general interaction-cognition gap in the social sciences recognized by Teun van Dijk (2007, see also Jost & Kruglanski, 2002) .
In an att empt to fi ll this gap, van Dijk (1989 Dijk ( , 2008 characterized two diff erent mental models needed to explain the act of text processing: the text model and the context model. While the text model represents the data currently being processed, the context model works as an overriding script-like structure representing the social situation (the subjective meaning of it) in which a particular act of information processing takes place. Th e text model activity is thus continuously controlled and shaped by the context model. Th erefore, despite changing conditions, the developing discourse maintains its suitability. We think that it is similar to a process in which a specifi c perspective of an I-position regulates and adjusts the ongoing information processing. It is the processing itself that both the subject and the researcher tend to focus on when studying the person's activity. Th e specifi c perspective of the I-position, however, is omitt ed from conscious thinking. Nonetheless, a context model, or as in the DST, the I-position works as an implicit determinant of the actual internal activity. Van Dijk's (2008) concept of context model imposes a wider perspective on researchers, in a similar way as the concept of an I-position did. Th is diff erence of perspectives provides scope for the integration of these theories in the discursive mind model
We assume that the activation of knowledge structures depends on the current social relational context, thus relational factors play a key role in this process. It is possible that the object of the knowledge itself also infl uences the processing of information (such as schemas or scripts); however, we would like to stress that the situational context activates the subject of perception, which becomes a dominant fi gure in processing knowledge . Th e transversal modularity described above refers to levels of representation divided by barriers in the fl ow of information. Th e second assumption indicates that the external relational context in which the cognitive activity takes place and the information stored before in the mind are the criteria of activating knowledge concerning the object of cognition. If diff erent contexts activate packages of representations linked with these contexts and present in the mind, then it is unlikely that information is processed entirely on one level of representation. According to our model's assumption, units of knowledge that develop in the mind are coherent in a particular frame of social reference but diff erent from units developed in other frames of reference. Th e source of knowledge is thus a criterion of development and diff erentiation of the longitudinal modules. Each level of representation is divided into further elements. Starting from the lowest levels, which are the earliest in development, a child learns ways of constructing meaning from the closest environments; the number of social contexts rises together with the development process. Even the lowest levels store records of diff erent patt erns of interpreting the incoming stimuli (pragmatic and semantic) existing in diff erent codes. Th ese codes form borders of a particular system of meaning and limit the possibility of information exchange. On the highest level, there are well developed, internally coherent longitudinal modules -which are similar to the I-positions in the dialogical self theory .
On the role of the subject
We assume that every piece of knowledge is "someone's", therefore for every piece of knowledge, we can ask who the subject of that knowledge is. Th ere is no knowledge without a subject3, just as there is no novel or handbook without an author. In addition, the social features of the subject are imprinted in the content and shape of the knowledge shared by it, as analysts of discourse argue (Van Dijk, 1997 ). For the model proposed here, the diff erentiation between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge is fundamental. It seems that the majority of research and concepts focus on the former aspect of the social cognition process, while the latt er remains relatively unknown and is not studied. Th e role of the subject is properly appreciated by those researchers in the social cognition approach who take into account the inter-subjective nature of the cognition process (Higgins, 2000) .
Th e contemporary processes of globalization (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010 ) and the complexity of the world not only determine that a person is involved in a variety of relations or is a member of a variety of groups, but also require the ability to hold multiple perspectives of interpreting one's experience and to adjust these perspectives appropriately to diff erent external contexts. Th is internal variety and variability, according to the theses of the model hereby presented, is refl ected in the architecture of the cognitive system. Th e diversity of a person's knowledge stemming from diff erent social contexts is recorded and stored in diff erent modules of representation, which form the cognitive system. Th ese modules are subject-oriented, which means that the subject of knowledge is a more important (although likely to be implicit) criterion of knowledge aggregation than its object; for it is a book's author that is a more signifi cant att ribute of knowledge creation than its title. Th us, diff erent modules may contain diff erent pieces of knowledge, even if they all concern the same object.
Cognitive architecture of the discursive mind
What are the consequences of this for the cognitive architecture of the mind? Let us consider the example shown in Figure 2 , which derives from an introspection of one of the authors (the fi rst one) of this paper. It shows the subjective meaning of the concept of "a dog", which turns out to have a slightly diff erent structure from a discursive mind concept perspective than it would have according to the contemporarily acknowledged idea of natural concepts (Rosch, 1978) (Figure 1 ). Natural concepts consist of a prototype and a number of exemplars of greater or smaller resemblance to the prototype. Th e resemblance can be interpreted as a distance and on its basis we can predict how fast the concept of "a dog" is activated when we are exposed to diff erent exemplars of dogs' images as more or less prototypical exemplars of this concept. For example, Figure 1 implies that the time for recognizing a given object as a dog should be shorter when a Dalmatian's image is presented and longer for an image of a badger dog or a Pekingese. In this case it is irrelevant from which social context the knowledge of diff erent examples of a dog comes -it is universal and organizes all information on dogs stored by a given person. Th e whole process looks diff erent from the perspective of the discursive mind model, in which -as shown in Figure 2 -the exemplars of "a dog" concept are organized in three diff erent circles. Each circle contains representations of diff erent dogs, which are constructed in certain social contexts. In this introspective example the "owner" of knowledge about dogs discovered that there are at least three diff erent concepts that play a major role: a dog breeder's handbook studied carefully when she was young (the author and title in Figure 2 are fi ctitious), a childhood experience of being bitt en by a particular dog called Pikuś, and current experience with her own dogs, which the author breeds and cares for with her daughters.
If cognitive representation is organized as described here, then the social context would defi nitely be important for the data processing speed, which should be refl ected by classical indicators such as reaction times or error rates. In the example from Figure 1 , the Pekingese should be recognized as a dog more quickly when the memories of a relationship with a friend (Pikuś was a Pekingese!) are activated than when the knowledge from Kitt en's dog handbook is active (a Pekingese is not a very representative example of this concept). Th e data showing the role of context was collected during studies on the exemplarbased approach (Rosch, 1978) ; however, in the discursive model of mind, there is more to be said.
Th e object of knowledge constructed in diff erent social contexts is seemingly the same; however, despite the same verbal etiquett e, the subjective meaning of a concept varies, just like the detailed att ributes of knowledge (see Table 1 ).
Th e example from Figure 1 , 2 and Table 1 appears to be simple; however, it is a good illustration of the essence of the specifi city of knowledge for social context, which -according to the discursive mind model -applies to a person's whole cognitive system. Th e aggregation of experience and knowledge in relatively independent modules is the basis for the organization of cognitive structures, any of them being able to contain concepts and all other forms of cognitive representation -schemas, scripts, narrations or procedures. Each module carries cognitive-aff ective resources that emerged and developed in a certain social context -within relationships with parents, peers, children, bosses or colleagues. Th e number and characteristics of these modules are the inter-individual variable, depending on the course of primary and secondary socialization processes in the case of a particular person.
Being barely more than the tip of the iceberg, knowledge that is explicit and of which one is aware, is coated with the implicit. As shown in Figure 3 , what envelops every piece of such explicit knowledge is the representation of personal experience. Th is stems from the social context in which it was acquired -relationships, being part of a group, growing up in a certain community. Personal implicit knowledge consists of the record of experience, which is theoretically accessible to the subject's awareness but usually remains under the threshold of his or her consciousness, being constantly engaged in processing information about an object of knowledge of which he or she is fully aware. Th is unit of representation also stores supra-individual, shared, inter-subjective, implicit knowledge, which concerns the social context and contains, among other things, the characteristics of interpersonal relationships in a given social circle as well as a representation of the identity of the subject and its partners ("who is who" in a certain relationship). It includes sets of beliefs and truths shared by members of this social circle. Figure 3 illustrates these ideas.
According to the discursive mind model, the I-positions proposed by the dialogical self theory are relatively autonomic modules of the cognitive system. Th ey consist of script-like structures combining personal and socially shared knowledge. Th ese structures are activated in certain conditions (automatically or intentionally 4 ) and henceforth -until the next I-position is activated -determine the range of information processed and the specifi c rules of this processing.
Personality -stable or labile?
As we have previously discussed , as a consequence of its assumptions the discursive mind model off ers an interesting approach to the classic problem of the stability vs. lability of personality. In this model, stability is, as in a range of other social-cognitive concepts, associated with a repertoire of knowledge structures latently existing in the mind. On the other hand, the model off ers an explanation of lability in the sense that only some particular modules of that knowledge are activated at a given time. Th e distinctive feature of the discursive mind model, and the dialogical self theory (Hermans, 1996) by which it was inspired, is the essential role of the subject of knowledge. It means that when a specifi c module of knowledge (an I-position) is activated, a specifi c tool of information processing is launched and the consequential activation of a certain content of a self-image is just one of the results of this shift in information processing. It refl ects the classic distinction of the Jamesian I and Me or "self-as-an-object" and "self-as-a-subject" and the new social-cognitive revision of these notions proposed by Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) .
Th e dialogical self theory has its origins in Hubert Hermans' (2001) perspective on the problem of personality stability and lability and his idea of merging the concepts of continuity and discontinuity of a person's subjective experience in one consistent theoretical construct. Comparing James' concept of I, consisting of diff erent parts of the self (characters), to Bakhtin's polyphonic structure of the novel and the multiplicity of its characters, Hermans points out the similarity between these concepts, but on the other hand emphasizes the point of diff erence between the two approaches. Th is diff erence concerns the existence of one domi-4 Although the diff erentiation between automatic and intentional activation of the I-positions was described by some DST researchers, in this model the distinction is not fully applicable to describing how the knowledge structures are activated. We believe that the activation of I-position is rather an automatic process, which occurs in a certain situational context. Even if we consider a specifi c situation in which certain I-positions are activated during an intentional (in a way!) process of recalling some memories, we argue that the activation itself is automatic even though the process of recalling may be perceived as intentional. Whether we recall intentionally or due to the fact that the I-position, which has access to certain memories, has been automatically activated by external stimuli, is a question of philosophical debate rather than empirical verifi cation and thus remains not covered by the model. nating I unifying all the parts of the self, which was assumed by James but ignored by Bakhtin. Hermans (2001) argues that these seemingly contradictory assumptions concerning the presence of the dominating I can, in fact, be both supported and even combined, bringing us to a description of the self as composed of many autonomous internally coherent centers of the interpretation of individual experience. Diff erent subjects can interpret the experience from diff erent perspectives.
As we have stated above, in the discursive mind the entire knowledge possessed by a person is always "someone's" knowledge. It is always constructed and used by a specifi c person of a specifi c identity. Th e subject of school knowledge is surely "a pupil", which may form an I-position in the discursive mind. Th e context in which this school knowledge was acquired is a relationship with a teacher and peers, in which such situations as being examined or studying for a test were natural and frequent. When an adult with such experience is later present in an entirely diff erent context and tries to recall information acquired in school, the discursive mind automatically activates his or her identity as a pupil, and with it all the diff erent expectations, beliefs and truths natural and implicit for the school context. Th ese portions of implicit knowledge, even if currently inadequate, can still be activated while recalling portions of explicit school knowledge and may infl uence the way in which the current situation is experienced or alter behavior, even though the current context is far from the original school environment. A similar, also highly probable example can be found in the work of Wertsch (1991) . Th ese kinds of eff ects are more approachable from the perspective of the discursive mind model, because it describes relations between cognitive-aff ective units diff erently as compared to classic models. Th e network of mutual activation is based on the sharing of relational context and the identity of the subject, not on the resemblance of explicit knowledge content.
Th e discursive mind model and the dialogical self theory: comparison
Th e discursive mind model fulfi lls a proposed shift of the dialogical self theory closer to social-cognitive approaches to personality (Bąk, 2009) . Th e dialogical self theory involves an approach that is hard to share with the social-cognitive approaches: It proposes a radical extension of the notion of self, which should include not only the inner content but also people or even institutions from the external world (Hermans & Kempen 1993; Hermans & Hermans-Jensen, 1995) , while the cognitive theories of self consider other people as an important element of the self's development; their representations may infl uence the content of the self, but the inclusion of external persons in the self is impossible (Bąk, 2009) . Similarly, the issue of divergence of self applies to comparisons between elements of the self-knowledge of a single indivisible subject in the social-cognitive approach, while the dialogical self theory implies many available subjects in-volved in a dynamic dialogue similar to real people's relations. Finally, a person's activity in social-cognitive approaches involves monitoring the discrepancies between standards of a unique subject: keeping small incoherencies between positive standards of the self and large discrepancies for negative standards. On the other hand, ideas -shared by the dialogical self theory -related to placing diff erent standards of evaluation of the surroundings and the person in diff erent subjects, with confl icts occurring between subjects and not inside the only subject, seem quite acceptable. According to Bąk (2009) , the areas of interest of the two approaches are diff erent: Th e social-cognitive theories concentrate on intra-psychological phenomena occurring for one subject, while the dialogical self theory focuses on interpersonal phenomena occurring between diff erent subjects inside one person's mind. He points out that the concept of multiplicity of cognitive subjects can be accepted by the social-cognitive approaches when it acquires a reliable description in the cognitive terminology, using such notions as "cognitive system", "representations", "information processing" to describe structural and functional solutions inside the mind.
Th e proposed model of the discursive mind complements the three main assumptions of the theory with the above-mentioned structural and functional solutions, which meet the requirements of cognitive psychology and are consistent with the dialogical self theory. Th e three problematic issues are:
1. Volitional self. Hubert Hermans (2003 Hermans ( , 2006 recognizes that the self moves between the I-positions volitionally, which enables the self to att ach to diff erent I-positions and gain their perspectives on interpreting experience. At the same time, the author highlights the lack of a central unit deciding which of the I-positions is currently given voice. Th is provokes a question: If the self is not a decisive unit, what role does its volitional character play in the theory? Is the process of giving voice to the I-positions dependent on the dialogues between them, or is the direction of action rather undertaken by the self, or do both factors apply? 2. Processes of giving voice to I-positions by the self. Th e process of giving voice to the I-positions by the self seems similar to the process of activation of cognitive structures, but this similarity is only superfi cial, because Hermans does not provide a description of the content of I-positions. Just as above, the processes of giving voice remain mainly a metaphor of interpersonal relations and refer to the intrapersonal level (Hermans, 1999b (Hermans, , 2004 . From the point of view of cognitive psychology, it should be distinguished whether this is just a metaphor or not, and if it is not -what kind of particular processes it involves . 3. Th e inner structure of the I-positions. Th is issue seems to remain beyond the scope of interest of the dialogical self theory's author. Despite the fact that Hermans suggests that the I-position includes some specifi c elements, such as individual beliefs, patt erns of evaluating meanings, dominant emotions or general life perspectives, the way in which they might be located inside the I-position is not really described, apart from stating that they are stored as perspectives and metaphors. Th is is far from being satisfactorily precise. Th ese problematic issues are tackled by the discursive mind model. Th e problem of volitional self is solved entirely by abandoning the notion of self. Th is makes inapplicable the issue of the self giving voice. Th e model focuses on the third issue -the inner structure of positions. Th ey are defi ned as modules of representation of experience. Th e modules do not have to be imaginatively given voice because as knowledge structures they can be evoked by external stimuli without the participation of the self. As a result, the model of the discursive mind provides reliable descriptions of processes proposed by the dialogical theory using terminology from the social-cognitive approach. For example, instead of "giving voice", it describes the activation of knowledge governed by the rules of the process of automatic activation of cognitive structures (for example notions, stereotypes, goals, see Bargh, 1994 Bargh, , 1997 Bargh, , 2006 .
Apart from the diff erent descriptions of content and rules of activating Ipositions and modules, there are other diff erences between the two approaches. Th e dialogical self theory highlights the aspect of communication between I-positions, which is defi ned by processes of dialogical accordance and discordance, while the discursive mind model brings more detail to it by presenting the limitations in communication as a result of diff erent codes of recording knowledge in the modules.
Th e model of the discursive mind assumes that there are longitudinal modules which do not include higher levels of information processing and thus disable the verbalization of and conscious refl ection on a personal experience, which corresponds to the idea of silent voices in the dialogical self theory. For example, the constitution of a silent I-position in the dialogical self theory suggests that this I-position is well developed and ready to be given voice by the self -it is just enough to make it more approachable to the self. It is diff erent with the module, which is not suffi ciently developed and requires being supported by the levels operating in the verbal code, which would enable conscious refl ection on personal experience. Modules do not have to be on the bott om of the activation hierarchy, as is the case with the silent positions, and even though they do not have higher levels of representation they can still be easily evoked and infl uence the processes of giving meaning and interpreting experience, without the person's awareness. Th is is an important consideration for clinical practice, close to the psychotherapeutic traditions of healing through developing verbal possibilities of elaborating the implicit contents of unconsciousness. Also, therapists inspired by the dialogical self theory suggest that disorders may occur not only on the level of dialogue but also on the level of I-positions (Dimaggio & Stiles, 2007) , stating that the subjective I-position may be damaged. Th e dialogical self theory does not provide tools for understanding defi cits inside I-positions. However, its advantage is a wide and complete description of relations between them, not presented in psychotherapeutic literature on such a level of detail.
Th e discursive mind model is also more precise compared to the I-position concept in conceptualizing the relations between a module and the external context. Modules are developed in relation to external carriers of discourse and can be activated by them. Hermans' theory refers to the imaginational inclusion of external objects into the I-position. It shows the role of imagination in conducting dialogues between the internal and external parts of the I-positions, so far underrated by researchers of the self, although the empirical verifi cation of this phenomenon requires its further defi nition.
Conclusion -toward experimental verifi cation of the discursive mind model
Th e discursive mind model, and particularly the assumption on the specifi city of knowledge structures for the social context, can be acknowledged as worthy of precise theoretical description and empirical verifi cation. Th is seems particularly important in the context of new trends in mainstream psychology that take greater account of phenomena of an inter-subjective nature (Higgins, 2000) . Th e model of the discursive mind and the DST off er an att ractive explanation of these kinds of social-cognitive phenomena.
Th e described model is characterized by great complexity. Such complexity makes unequivocal verifi cation harder to perform. In an att empt to solve this problem, we used rigorous methodology and performed a series of experiments (for more information, see Suszek et al., 2010 , Stemplewska-Żakowicz et al., 2012 . Th ese empirical studies were aimed at checking the eff ects of activation of diff erent I-positions on cognitive processes and behavior. We showed that cognitive-aff ective resources of the I-positions activated in a particular context are more easily accessible than resources of the I-positions that are not activated. Th is eff ect was visible in several experimental measures, such as reaction times, error rates and others. Our results support the hypothesis that I-positions have their own specifi c cognitive-aff ective resources and that the main constructs of the DST, such as the I-position and positioning, are empirically real and can produce eff ects that are observable by means of empirical and experimental investigation. Th e model of the discursive mind and its empirical verifi cation not only gives support to the DST but can also be a vehicle of its contribution to theories stemming from other theoretical traditions. In particular, the idea of placing a dialogue in sociocultural and relational contexts -as a basis for module formation in the mind -can be valuable in advancing general psychological understanding of cognition and personality.
Th e next step would be to describe how diff erent modules in the discursive mind interact with each other, i.e. how diff erent situations and circumstances prime the revelation of diff erent pieces of knowledge and diff erent ways of experience interpretation. We hope that future research in this direction can help us understand and capture the complexity and dynamics of the discursive mind.
